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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3696 
 ___________ 
 
 MEI CHEN,  
 a/k/a Mei Mei Lin  
 a/k/a Mei Hua Chen 
              
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
                                          Mei Chen, 
                                                    Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-250-759) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 13, 2013 
 
 Before: SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 26, 2013 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Via a petition for review, Mei Chen challenges a Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) order of removal that denied her applications for relief.  For the following reasons, 
we will deny her petition. 
 Chen is a citizen of the People‘s Republic of China, hailing from Fujian Province.  
Using a fraudulent passport, she entered the United States in 1999.  Many years later, 
following the birth of her first child and during her second pregnancy, Chen filed an 
application for asylum and related relief, claiming that she feared persecution in her 
native China based on her violation of the one-child policy and her conversion to 
Christianity since arriving in the United States.  An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the 
application, concluding—on the basis of an inconclusive evidentiary record and in light 
of agency and Circuit case law—that Chen had not met her burden of proof. 
 Chen appealed.  The BIA affirmed in a thorough opinion, holding that Chen‘s fear 
of persecution was not objectively reasonable.  Turning first to Chen‘s Christianity claim, 
the BIA pointed to a lack of factual development and a wide spectrum (in terms of both 
locality and variety) of tolerated religious practices in China, compounded by Chen‘s 
lack of firsthand experience as a practicing Christian in her country of citizenship.  With 
regard to Chen‘s one-child claim, the BIA noted, first, that Chen had not persuasively 
shown that her children would be considered Chinese nationals for the purpose of the 
one-child policy.  Second, even if Chen‘s children would be considered Chinese 
nationals, record evidence supported the IJ‘s conclusion that they would not be counted 
under the policy so long as they were not added to the household registration.  The BIA 
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also questioned whether Chen had actually violated the policy to begin with.  Finally, 
even assuming that Chen had violated the policy and that her children would be counted 
under it, Chen had not shown that the measures taken against her would likely rise to the 
level of persecution.  Because Chen had failed to satisfy the burden of proof required to 
obtain asylum relief, her withholding of removal claim necessarily failed, too.
1
   
 Chen now seeks review from this Court.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a) to review the BIA‘s decision, looking to the IJ‘s opinion only to the extent that 
the BIA deferred to it.  Factual findings are evaluated under the ―substantial evidence‖ 
standard: we may reverse them only if no reasonable fact finder could make that finding 
on the administrative record.  See Malik v Att‘y Gen., 659 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2011); 
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (―[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive 
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‖).2  
―So long as the BIA‘s decision is supported by ‗reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole,‘ we will not disturb [its] disposition of the 
case.‖  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).     
Because Chen did not claim to have suffered persecution in the past, she applied 
                                                 
1
 Chen waived consideration of her Convention Against Torture claim on appeal. 
 
2
 Chen suggests that we should review, in part, for an abuse of discretion.  See Pet‘r‘s Br. 
7.  However, she does not challenge any agency decision, such as a denial of a motion to 
reopen, that would be subject to that standard.  See, e.g., Oliva-Ramos v. Att‘y Gen., 694 
F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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for asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution if she were to be removed 
to China.  See Dong v. Att‘y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 2011).  The BIA 
determined that Chen‘s fear was not objectively reasonable, and we find its conclusion to 
be supported by substantial evidence.   
Chen argues that the BIA erred with regard to her religion claim because ―the 
Chinese government will not allow her to freely practice her religion.‖  The BIA 
correctly dismissed this claim as speculative, observing that it was ―not clear which 
church she would attend in China or whether the government would become aware of her 
religious convictions.‖  See Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasizing that fear of future persecution cannot be based on ―speculative 
conclusions‖).  The BIA acknowledged that the 2007 Religious Freedom Report on 
China indicates that religious repression can and does occur, especially with regard to 
unsanctioned groups and their leaders, but indicated that the report also stresses the 
―regional‖ variations in treatment of these groups.  While abhorrent, not all ―harassment 
and discrimination‖ necessarily rises to the level of ―persecution‖ contemplated by the 
asylum statute.  See Wong v. Att‘y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  We therefore 
conclude that the record does not compel a contrary outcome.  See also Chen v. 
Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1137–38 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing the 2003 Religious 
Freedom Report in the context of a very similar claim). 
Chen‘s one-child claim is more troubling, but we ultimately find that substantial 
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evidence supports the BIA‘s conclusion.  Chen argues that she has satisfied the three-
pronged standard for such a claim set out by Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (BIA 
2007): ―the details of local family planning policies, proof that an alien violated such 
policies, and evidence that local enforcement efforts against the violation will rise to the 
level of persecution.‖  Id. at 201.3  She points to her submission of ―evidence establishing 
the details of the local family planning policy,‖ evidence tending to show a ―violat[ion 
of] the policy,‖ and evidence that the response to her violation would be either forced 
sterilization or economic penalties so severe as to constitute persecution.  Chen also 
suggests that the BIA failed to consider certain evidence before it, and was derelict in 
declining to credit her evidentiary submissions.  But the BIA specifically determined that 
she had not met the J-H-S- test, pointing to conflicting information in the administrative 
record, including uncertainty over whether Chen had actually violated China‘s family 
planning policies based on her agricultural registration and the five-year stretch 
separating the births of her children.  And even if Chen was in violation of the policy, the 
BIA concluded that the evidence she submitted—letters from persons whose stories, 
while alarming, did not precisely mirror her situation; statements from village committees 
and other Chinese government sources that were unauthenticated—did not counterweigh 
evidence suggesting that whatever penalty she might draw for her violation would not 
                                                 
3
 Chen does not challenge the validity of the J-H-S- formulation, but we note that several 
of our sister Circuits have approved it.  See, e.g., Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157 
(2d Cir. 2008); Wang v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 615, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2007).  We have 
discussed J-H-S- on several occasions, albeit not in a precedential opinion. 
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amount to persecution.
4
  As the Government points out, even if we disagreed with the 
BIA under a de novo standard of review, under the ―substantial evidence‖ standard we 
must leave the agency‘s findings undisturbed unless a reasonable fact finder would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.  See Jarbough v. Att‘y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 
(3d Cir. 2007).   The record does not compel a contrary outcome here. 
Because we determine that the BIA‘s asylum decision was supported by 
substantial evidence, it necessarily follows that Chen has not satisfied the ―more 
demanding‖ standard of obtaining withholding of removal relief.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez 
v. Att‘y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, the petition for review will be 
denied. 
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 Chen specifically assails the agency‘s decision to give less weight to some of her 
submissions, arguing that her credibility should extend to the contents of her evidentiary 
proffer.  She cites no cases for this proposition.  Of course, an alien‘s credibility can be 
closely tied to the materials she submits, but an otherwise-credible person can 
nevertheless submit fraudulent, questionable, or unauthenticated documents without 
herself being deemed dishonest.  Cf. Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 
2008) (discussing test used to associate alien‘s submission of a fraudulent document with 
his lack of credibility). 
 
